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 Societal Trust and Corporate Tax Avoidance  
Abstract 
 
Using an international sample of firms and a country-level index for societal trust, we study how 
differences in trust across countries relate to corporate tax avoidance. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find strong evidence that societal trust is negatively associated with corporate tax 
avoidance by firms, even after controlling for other determinants such as home country tax 
system characteristics. We also explore the effects of three country-level institutional 
characteristics – level of investor protection, disclosure requirement, and tax enforcement – on 
the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. We predict and find that the effects of trust 
on tax avoidance are more pronounced when these institutions are weaker.   
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Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text. 
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Societal Trust and Corporate Tax Avoidance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate tax avoidance is generally considered as exploiting the complexities, technicalities and 
loopholes in the tax laws (Dowling 2013). Legal tax avoidance may also involve creative tax 
accounting and/or earnings management. Here, managers exercise their discretion over the 
reported numbers without violating any laws or generally accepted accounting principles, with 
the objective of reducing the firm’s tax burden.1 One strand of prior literature (e.g., Dyreng et al. 
2008; Atwood et al. 2012) generally considers the behavior of corporate tax avoidance as not 
necessarily implying that firms are engaging in improper behavior because managing tax costs is 
viewed as a necessary and appropriate component of a firm’s long-term strategy. These tax 
planning activities result in greater tax savings and hence better align the interests of the firm and 
its shareholders (Swenson 1999).
2
  
An alternative view of corporate tax avoidance is based on social norm theory, which 
suggests that corporate tax avoidance is not considered to be right and just from a general public 
point of view because it imposes costs on society (Elster 1989; Dowling 2013). In particular, 
under this view, firms are expected to pay their “fair share” of tax on their profits to the State.3 
Also, what is considered to be fair may be conditional on the type of tax regime (progressive vs. 
regressive) imposed on less well-endowed individuals and smaller firms that generally have less 
room and leeway to avoid taxes. In essence, this view is societal in nature. 
                                                 
1 We follow prior research (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Atwood et al. 2012) and define corporate tax 
avoidance broadly as the reduction in explicit taxes paid, and measure tax avoidance as the difference between the 
firm’s “unmanaged tax amount” (the home-country statutory corporate tax rate times pre-tax earnings before 
exceptional items) and its “managed tax amount” (current taxes paid). This difference reflects how aggressively 
managers pursue strategies that reduce taxes paid. 
2 Consistent with tax avoidance enhancing shareholder value, some recent studies find that tax avoidance is 
associated with a lower cost of equity and better future firm performance (e.g., Blaylock 2011; Goh et al. 2013). 
3 Here, a fair share can be considered as the statutory tax rate times a reasonable estimate of the firm’s taxable 
profits. Thus, our measure of corporate tax avoidance captures the deviations from the fair share of tax payable. 
2 
 
In this study, we examine the effects of societal trust on corporate tax avoidance for a 
sample of firms from 25 countries. Zand (1972) defines interpersonal trust as the willingness of 
one person to increase her vulnerability to the actions of another person whose behavior cannot 
be controlled. In particular, trust is an action taken by a party in an economic transaction with the 
anticipation that the other party in the transaction will not exploit the vulnerability that the party 
has created for herself by taking an action with an uncertain outcome (James 2002; Bohnet et al. 
2008). The extant literature finds that trust affects a broad set of social and economic outcomes. 
For instance, prior studies find that having a higher level of societal trust facilitates economic 
growth and social efficiency (La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack and Zak 
2001), international trade and investment (Guiso et al. 2009), financial development (Guiso et al. 
2004, 2008), corporate financing, and merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions (Bottazi et al. 
2011; Duarte et al. 2012; Ahern et al. 2013). In sum, there is a well-established literature 
supporting the notion that trust underlies virtually all economic exchanges.    
  Despite the wealth of studies reporting significant social and economic effects of trust at 
the individual level and national level, only recently have researchers begun examining its effects 
at the firm level and, in particular, its effects on financial reporting.  Nanda and Wysocki (2013) 
examine the relation between societal trust and firms’ financial transparency, and how firms’ 
external capital demand affects this relation. They document a robust positive association 
between trust and financial transparency across countries. Nanda and Wysocki (2013) also find 
that firms’ demand for external capital amplifies the positive association, suggesting that trust is 
an important factor affecting the relation between financial transparency and external financing. 
Pevzner et al. (2013) examine whether the level of trust in a country affects investor perception 
and utilization of information transmitted by firms through financial disclosure. They document 
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that trust increases investor reaction to earnings announcements and that the reaction is more 
pronounced (1) when a country’s investor protection and disclosure requirements are weaker, (2) 
when a country’s average education level is lower, and (3) when firm level information 
asymmetry is higher.  
In this study, we posit that the level of societal trust in an economy is negatively related 
to corporate tax avoidance for the following reasons. First, in societies with higher levels of trust, 
managers will most likely refrain from actions that may betray the trust that society has placed in 
them with an expectation that they pay a fair share of corporate taxes. In the context of tax 
avoidance, societal trust is a critical factor given that the design of tax codes and their 
enforcement are difficult. According to Freedman (2010), tax avoidance is characterized by what 
is called “rules lawyering” or “creative compliance,” and as such will be influenced by factors 
other than legal and extra-legal systems. Hence, managers in high trust societies are more likely 
to reciprocate the trust society places in them and be more sensitive to fairness considerations. 
Second, consistent with the evidence documented in Nanda and Wysocki (2013), we argue that 
firms in high trust societies will likely have higher earnings quality, and engage in lower 
earnings management and other opportunistic reporting practices. In general, earnings 
management can be closely related to tax management. For example, Frank et al. (2009) find a 
strong, positive relation between aggressive tax and financial reporting.
4
 Chen et al. (2012) 
document that tax planning and earnings quality jointly affect the relative informativeness of 
book and taxable income, suggesting that firms in more trusting societies are likely to be more 
transparent, and hence are likely to have less tax-motivated earnings management. Third, 
Pevzner et al. (2013) document that corporate earnings are more credible in more trusting 
                                                 
4 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that aggressive earnings management and tax planning can be complementary to 
one another. For instance, Enron managed to commit a massive fraud while engaging in aggressive tax sheltering 
activities at the same time. 
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societies. This relation implies that taxes paid on these earnings are also likely to be fairer given 
that the sources of income are likely to be more transparent to the tax authorities and thereby 
facilitate a fair assessment of tax. Fourth, prior research suggests that tax avoidance transactions 
provide management with the tools, masks, and justifications for opportunistic managerial 
behavior (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). We argue that managers (“agents”) expect to be treated 
fairly by shareholders (“principal”) as well as by other stakeholders in high trust societies, and 
hence are less likely to extract private rents through complicated tax avoidance activities.  
We examine the relation between trust and tax avoidance in a large sample of 79,834 
firm-year observations across 25 countries spanning the years from 1995 to 2007. Following 
prior studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Guiso et al. 2008; Nanda and Wysocki 2013; Pevzner et 
al. 2013), we measure a country’s level of societal trust by its citizens’ average response to the 
following question in World Value Surveys (WVS): “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Consistent with our prediction, we find strong evidence that societal trust is negatively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance by firms. This effect is also economically significant. 
When we exclude (include) home country tax system characteristics, a one standard deviation 
increase in societal trust is associated with a 28.2% (3.3%) decrease in tax avoidance. This 
suggests that societal trust plays a significant role in mitigating tax avoidance over and above the 
effects of formal institutions such as home country tax system characteristics, which are 
arguably more effective in constraining tax avoidance. 
Prior research (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012) documents that corporate tax avoidance is lower 
in countries with higher quality institutional characteristics such as legal tradition and strength of 
investor rights. Because trust, as a part of culture and social capital, does not develop in a 
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vacuum, we explore the interactions between societal trust and formal institutions and other 
country characteristics, and their joint effects on tax avoidance. We consider three country-level 
institutional characteristics – level of investor protection, disclosure requirement, and tax 
enforcement. We predict that the effects of trust are more pronounced when these institutions are 
weaker. We find results consistent with these expectations. We then subject our main results to a 
battery of sensitivity tests, including using an instrumental variable approach to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, controlling for accrual components to ensure that our results are not 
driven by the mechanical relation between accruals and tax avoidance, using three alternative 
measures of trust, using two alternative measures of tax avoidance, and accounting for over-
representation in the sample of U.S. and Japanese firms. Our inferences are robust to these 
sensitivity tests. 
Our study provides several important contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature investigating cross-country determinants of tax avoidance. Atwood et al. (2012) 
find that tax avoidance across countries is associated with formal institutions, required book-tax 
conformity, worldwide versus territorial approach, and perceived strength of enforcement. We 
extend their findings by showing that informal institutions such as societal trust also affect tax 
avoidance, after explicitly controlling for the tax system characteristics studied in Atwood et al. 
(2012). We also show that societal trust is particularly important when formal institutions are 
weaker. 
Second, our study extends the growing literature on societal trust. This literature suggests 
that trust is a key element of a country’s culture that affects economic exchanges, financing 
opportunities, performance and development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack and Zak 2001; 
Guiso et. al. 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009). Except for Nanda and Wysocki (2013) and Pevzner et 
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al. (2013), very few studies examine the relation between trust and financial reporting. We 
contribute to this literature by documenting the effects of societal trust on firms’ tax reporting 
decisions.  
Third, our study should be of interest to tax policymakers concerned about declining 
corporate tax revenues and the increasing gap between reported earnings and taxable income, 
who suggest that regulations such as tightening tax loopholes and increasing tax enforcement are 
likely to result in lower tax avoidance (Shulman 2009; DOT 2011; Gravelle 2011; Hufbauer 
2011; Keener 2011; Zrust 2011). Our findings suggest that societal trust acts as a substitute for 
these formal institutions in mitigating tax avoidance incentives. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we discuss related research 
on societal trust, and develop our predictions on the effects of societal trust on corporate tax 
avoidance and on how these effects may vary across different institutional settings. We present 
the measures of our main variables of interest and research design in section three, discuss the 
main results in section four, and present the results of additional analyses and robustness checks 
in section five. We provide our conclusions in section six. 
 
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior Research on Trust 
Trust is the overarching economic issue facing market participants, including regulators across 
the world. Arrow (1974) frames trust as an enabler for stimulating the economy and Fukayama 
(1995) views it as social capital. According to Fukuyama, trust can be thought of as a form of 
social capital – a shared asset that benefits all in the economy. Arrow (1974) stresses the ubiquity 
of trust (as a transaction cost depressant) in almost every economic transaction. He argues that 
higher rates of investment and growth are positively associated with higher levels of trust. Khalil 
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(1994) suggests that in market-based societies, where individuals are motivated by rational, self-
interested behavior, there is a greater need for trust than in kin-based or other forms of economic 
organization. He notes that, “First, as economic exchange becomes less intermingled with 
kinship and more based on formal contractual relationships, the monitoring conducted by the kin 
members and the threat of ostracism almost vanish. Second, the modern judicial system, which 
replaces the threat system of ostracism and shunning, cannot practically monitor the extensive 
growth of contractual agreements – even the explicit ones” (Khalil 1994, 340). Therefore, the 
need for trust, integrity and reciprocity is greater in a market-based economy, where most control 
mechanisms are incomplete at best. 
Arrow (1974) argues that, because of asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, and 
the prohibitive transaction costs of perfect monitoring, much economic activity requires trust and 
reciprocity in order for mutual gains from exchange to be realized. Prior research documents that 
trust and reciprocity can serve as a substitute for or as a complement to more formal governance 
structures (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; Larcker and Tayan 2013). Trust implies that an 
individual will subordinate his/her self-interests to the “joint interests” of the group under most 
conceivable circumstances (Arino et al. 2001). Furthermore, if business/agency relationships 
built on trust and reciprocity can succeed, then the dead-weight loss on welfare imposed by 
costly incentive and monitoring systems can be avoided. Consistent with the notion that trust 
plays an important role in economic and social exchanges, prior studies find that having a higher 
level of societal trust facilitates economic growth and social efficiency (La Porta et al. 1997; 
Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack and Zak 2001), international trade and investment (Guiso et al. 
2009), financial development (Guiso et al. 2004, 2008), corporate financing and merger and 
acquisition (M&A) transactions (Bottazi et al. 2011; Duarte et al. 2012; Ahern et al. 2013). To 
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date, very few studies explore the implications of trust on accounting properties, with the notable 
exceptions of Nanda and Wysocki (2013) and Pevzner et al. (2013), who examine the impact of 
trust on financial transparency and investor reaction to earnings announcements, respectively. 
We extend these prior studies by examining how societal trust influences the extent of corporate 
tax avoidance.  
Societal trust and Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Using predominantly U.S. data, prior research identifies several firm characteristics that are 
associated with tax avoidance across firms. These characteristics include firm size, profitability, 
leverage, capital intensity, and foreign operations (e.g., Stickney and McGee 1982; Zimmerman 
1983; Porcano 1986; Shevlin and Porter 1992; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003). More 
recent research reports that companies accused of tax sheltering are more profitable, report larger 
book-tax differences, have higher R&D spending and less leverage, and operate subsidiaries in 
foreign tax havens (Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). Further, ownership 
structure (family ownership and dual class share structure) is related to tax avoidance behavior 
(Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2011). Hoi et al. (2013) find that firms with more irresponsible 
CSR activities, particularly those with excessive irresponsible CSR activities in a given year, 
have a higher probability of engaging in tax sheltering, greater discretionary/permanent book-tax 
differences, and lower cash effective tax rates.   
More recently, Dyreng et al. (2010) suggest that individual executives are an important 
determinant in their employers’ tax avoidance, i.e., these managers have an incremental effect on 
tax avoidance that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Boone et al. (2013) examine the 
relation between religiosity and tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers. They find 
that firms headquartered in more religious U.S. counties are less likely to avoid taxes. They also 
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find that religiosity is consistently associated with lower tax avoidance by individual taxpayers 
as measured by underreported income. Brown and Drake (2013) examine whether network ties 
help explain variation in tax avoidance, and how the relation between network ties and tax 
avoidance varies depending on the nature and context of those ties. Using board interlocks to 
proxy for these connections, they find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have 
lower cash ETRs. They also report that ties to low-tax firms are more influential when the focal 
firm and its network partner are operationally and strategically similar, as are ties created by 
executive directors. Board ties to low-tax firms are also more influential when the focal firm and 
its network partner engage the same local auditor. Overall, Brown and Drake’s (2013) results 
suggest that the influence of firms’ network ties on their tax avoidance behavior depends on the 
character of those ties. These recent studies highlight the importance of studying cultural effects 
such as religion and social networks in understanding tax avoidance behavior. In this spirit we 
focus on the effects of societal trust on corporate tax avoidance.  
Prior studies primarily explore tax avoidance across firms within one country and mainly 
within the U.S. In recent research, Atwood et al. (2012) examine whether three tax system 
characteristics – required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial approach, and 
perceived strength of enforcement – impact corporate tax avoidance across countries. They find 
that, on average, firms avoid taxes less when required book-tax conformity is higher, a 
worldwide approach is used, and tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. However, the 
relations between tax avoidance and all three tax system characteristics are contextual and 
depend on the extent to which management compensation comes from variable pay, including 
bonuses, stock awards, and stock options. We extend this line of research to examine the effects 
of societal trust on corporate tax avoidance in a cross-country setting. In our analysis, we 
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explicitly control for the three tax system characteristics studied in Atwood et al. (2012). 
We expect societal trust to be negatively related to corporate tax avoidance for several 
reasons. First, because managers in high trust societies are more likely to reciprocate to the trust 
society places in them and to be more sensitive to fairness considerations, they are less likely to 
avoid taxes. Specifically, the link between societal trust and corporate tax avoidance behavior is 
predicated on social norm theory. Sunstein (1996) defines norms as “… social attitudes of 
approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done …”.  
Francois and Zabojnik (2005) assert that societal trust is an example of a social norm. Society 
utilizes control mechanisms such as “open criticism” and “withdrawal of social support” (Horne 
2009; Hechter and Opp 2001) to punish individuals who violate these norms. Conversely, those 
who behave in accordance with these norms may receive “higher levels of social recognition 
(public acknowledgement of their status, merits, or personality) and respect” (Stavrova et al. 
2013). In the context of tax avoidance, societal trust is a critical factor given that design of tax 
codes and their enforcement are difficult.  According to Freedman (2010), tax avoidance is 
characterized by what is called “rules lawyering” or “creative compliance”. Rules lawyering 
involves exploiting the complexities, technicalities and loop holes in the law, which, in the case 
of countries with complex tax codes such as the U.K. and the U.S., can be quite considerable. 
Legal tax avoidance may also involve creative tax accounting and/or earnings management, with 
the objective of reducing the firm’s taxable income. Corporate tax avoidance, which clearly 
violates a firm’s responsibility to contribute to society, does breach the trust society places in the 
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managers of corporations (Dowling 2013).
5
 Therefore, managers of corporations located in a 
high trust society would be less likely to act in a manner that violates a social norm to avoid 
facing social sanctions. 
Second, consistent with the evidence documented in Nanda and Wysocki (2013), we 
argue that firms in high-trust societies will have higher earnings quality, and engage in lower 
earnings management and other opportunistic reporting practices. Nanda and Wysocki (2013) 
assert that in high-trust economies, managers are more likely to disclose information because 
they believe that investors are more likely to revise their priors in light of accounting disclosures 
when they view these disclosures as credible. Mistrust on the other hand would lead capital 
market participants to disregard disclosed information, thereby reducing managers’ incentives to 
be forthcoming. Further, greater trust in an economy promotes the development of institutions 
that complement financial reporting and disclosure and thus increases the returns to firms 
reporting and disclosure activities (Carlin et al. 2009; Boduh-creed 2011). In general, aggressive 
earnings management can also be linked to aggressive tax management. For example, Frank et 
al. (2009) find that firms can manage reported book income upwards and taxable income 
downwards simultaneously. Chen et al. (2012) document that that tax planning and earnings 
quality jointly affect the relative informativeness of book and taxable income. Therefore, firms in 
more trusting societies are likely to be more transparent and hence likely to have less tax-
motivated earnings management.  
                                                 
5 Christensen (Christensen and Murphy 2004; Christensen 2011) argues that the payment of corporate tax is the area 
where corporate citizenship is most tangible and most important. He aggressively supports the view that paying tax 
is a prime social responsibility of the modern corporation. The tax legislation in some countries like Australia also 
supports this view. It provides for the authorities to determine if schemes or arrangements that are used are 
substantive (i.e., they create business value) or whether they are merely of a form to artificially lower the tax base 
(Gilders et al. 2004). 
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Third, Pevzner et al. (2013) document that corporate earnings are more credible in more 
trusting societies. Specifically, they find that trust is positively associated with a country’s 
aggregate earnings quality and that higher quality earnings generate stronger investor reactions. 
However, even holding earnings quality constant, Pevzner et al. (2013) still find evidence of 
significantly stronger investor reactions to earnings announcements in more trusting countries. 
The findings of higher earnings quality and more credible earnings announcements in countries 
with higher societal trust imply that taxes paid on these earnings are also likely to be fairer given 
that the sources of income are likely to be more transparent to the tax authorities and thereby 
facilitate a fairer assessment of tax. Therefore, we expect that in more trusting societies there will 
be less corporate tax avoidance. 
Lastly, tax aggressive behavior calls into question the integrity and risk profile/appetite of 
management and exacerbates the agency problems between the firm and its stakeholders.
6
 Tax 
aggressiveness could indicate management’s attitude towards compliance with rules and 
regulations (Hanlon et al. 2012, footnote 11). A weak tone at the top and its effect on the control 
environment can increase the likelihood that the stakeholders might not be able to uncover tax 
avoidance activities. Societal trust can play an important role in the interaction between 
managers and outside investors given incomplete contracting and the potential for moral hazard 
(Williamson 1993; Guiso et al. 2008; Carlin et al. 2009). Self-serving managers have incentives 
to use aggressive tax behavior to extract rents (Desai and Dharmapala 2006). Trust, which 
reflects “the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated” 
(Guiso et al. 2008), clearly has the potential to influence cheating of firms in terms of avoiding 
                                                 
6 Studies have shown that aggressive tax behavior is driven by “tone at the top” (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Dyreng et al. 2010). Further, Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that tax avoidance is a risky activity, which imposes 
costs on both firms and managers and thus, managers must be incentivized to engage in tax avoidance that involves 
uncertain outcomes. They find that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake more aggressive (i.e., 
risky) tax positions.  
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taxes. Specifically, we predict that managers expect to be treated fairly by shareholders in high 
trust societies and, therefore, the rent extraction arising from agency problems is likely to be less 
acute and managers are less likely to extract rents through complicated tax arrangements.  
Based on the discussion above, we posit the following (in alternate form): 
H1:  Societal trust is negatively related to a firm’s tax avoidance.  
 
Because corporate tax avoidance may be impacted by the institutional environment 
(Atwood et al. 2012), and societal trust, as a part of culture and social capital, does not develop 
in a vacuum, we explore the interaction between societal trust and formal institutions and other 
country characteristics and their joint effects on tax avoidance.  
Prior studies in the trust literature (e.g., Williamson 1993; Guiso et al. 2004; Carlin et al. 
2009; Aghion et al. 2010) either argue or show that trust and formal institutions are substitutes. 
Similar findings are also documented in the accounting literature. For example, Lang et al. 
(2004) find that analysts are particularly important for firms with controlling families/managers 
in environments in which legal institutions provide poor protection for minority shareholders. 
Lang et al. (2012) document that firm-level transparency is positively related to liquidity, and the 
relation is more pronounced when country-level investor protection and disclosure requirements 
are weaker. More recently, Pevzner et al. (2013) find that trust is more strongly related to 
corporate earnings announcement returns when investor protection is weaker and disclosure 
requirement is more lax. In light of these findings, we expect a substitutive relation between trust 
and formal institutions, and we predict that the effect of trust on tax avoidance is more 
pronounced when country-level investor protection and disclosure requirement are weaker. In 
other words, trust is likely to play a more important role in constraining tax avoidance when 
country-level investor protection and disclosure requirement are weaker. 
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Atwood et al. (2012) document that firms avoid taxes less when tax enforcement is 
perceived to be stronger. When managers perceive that government enforcement of tax rules is 
stronger, the higher expected probability of detection and potential for imposition of penalties 
may discourage tax avoidance. Desai et al. (2007) examine a sample of Russian firms following 
an increase in tax enforcement after the 2000 election of Vladimir Putin. They find that tax 
payments increased, related party trades were curtailed, and tax haven entities were abandoned. 
In a similar vein, we hypothesize that the effect of trust on corporate tax avoidance is less 
pronounced when tax enforcement in a country is relatively stronger.  
Based on the above reasoning, we posit the following (in alternate form): 
H2a: The negative relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the 
country-level investor protection is stronger. 
 
H2b: The negative relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the 
country-level disclosure requirement is stronger. 
 
H2c: The negative relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the 
country-level tax enforcement is stronger. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Measure of Societal trust 
Following prior literature (e.g. Guiso et al. 2008; Ahern et al. 2013; Pevzner et al. 2013), we 
construct our measure of societal trust based on responses to the following question from Wave 4 
and Wave 5 of the World Values Survey (WVS): “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The two 
possible answers were “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be too careful”. We recode the 
response to this question to one if a survey participant reports that most people can be trusted, 
and zero otherwise. We then calculate the mean of the response for each country-year as our 
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measure of societal trust (TRUST). For this measure, higher values correspond to higher societal 
trust.
7
 
As noted by Guiso et al. (2010), an individual’s response to this question captures her 
level of generalized trust, i.e., trust toward generic members of the population in her own 
country. Given that corporations are ultimately run by individuals, we use this measure that is 
based on individual’s response as a proxy for mutual trust between firms and individuals within a 
country. In robustness analysis, we use a measure that captures individuals’ confidence in the 
government and parliament, which ultimately affect how tax revenue is redistributed to ensure 
social equity and thus affects firms’ incentives to pay their fair share of taxes. Our results 
continue to hold when we use these alternative measures of societal trust (see Section V). 
Measure of Tax Avoidance 
Following Atwood et al. (2012), we define tax avoidance broadly as the reduction in the explicit 
taxes paid. We measure tax avoidance as the difference between the tax on pre-tax income 
computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax rate and the taxes actually paid, expressed 
as a percentage of pre-tax income. In particular, our measure of tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) for 
firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
           
 ∑             ∑       
 
   
 
   
∑        
 
   
                                                                             
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is home-country statutory corporate 
tax rate, and CTP is current taxes paid. We compute this measure using a three-year window 
because this time period is adequate to reduce the effects of items that reverse in just one year. 
                                                 
7
 Prior research shows that aggregate levels of this trust proxy correlate well across countries with a number of 
indicators of levels of trustworthiness, such as the level of corruption (Uslaner 2002) and the prevalence of violent 
crime (Lederman et al. 2002). This is expected if the open-ended wording of the generalized trust question leads 
respondents to rely on widely different interpretations (or guesses) as to what the question refers to.  
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We do not compute it over longer windows, such as five-year or ten-year windows (e.g., Dyreng 
et al. 2008), to avoid limiting our sample size.
8
 This measure of tax avoidance indicates the 
amount of taxes that the firm is able to avoid relative to the amount of taxes it is supposed to pay 
based on the home country statutory tax rate (“unmanaged tax amount”), and the extent of tax 
avoidance is increasing in this measure.  
Empirical Models – Main Analyses 
To test H1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
TAXAVOIDit = α + βTRUSTit + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit                    (2) 
where TAXAVOID is the measure of tax avoidance, TRUST is the measure of societal trust, 
CONTROLS is a vector of firm-level and country-level controls, and YEAR_FE and IND_FE are 
indicator variables for time and industry, respectively.
9
 Because we conduct our hypothesis 
testing on a pooled sample, we cluster the standard errors by firm and include time and industry 
fixed-effects in our regressions (Petersen 2009).
10
 The Appendix includes the detailed definitions 
of all the variables. Based on H1, we expect higher societal trust to be associated with lower tax 
avoidance and hence, we expect β to be negative. 
                                                 
8 As noted by Dyreng et al. (2008), tax avoidance measures that are estimated over short periods of time may be 
imperfect because they include payments to (and refunds from) the tax authorities upon settling of tax disputes that 
arose years ago. Tax avoidance measures that are estimated over longer periods mitigate this concern because the 
income to which these taxes relate will more likely be included in the same ratio as the taxes. As a sensitivity check, 
we use a longer horizon of five years to compute tax avoidance, and the results are qualitatively unchanged (see 
section V). 
9
 Industries are defined as in the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following SIC codes: 
agriculture (0100–0999), mining and construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles 
and printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive 
(2900–2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation 
(4000–4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379) and computers 
(3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
10 Petersen (2009) suggests that in the presence of cross-sectional and time-series dependence, one dependence 
effect can be addressed parametrically (e.g., including time dummies for cross-sectional dependence) and then 
standard errors clustered on the other dependence effect (e.g., clustering by firms for time-series dependence) can be 
estimated. As we have more firm than year observations, we use year dummies and cluster by firms because a larger 
number of clusters lead to standard errors that are less biased. 
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 We select CONTROLS that are factors documented by prior literature to be associated 
with tax avoidance (Atwood et al. 2012). The first set of controls includes country-level variables 
(WW, BTAXC, TAXRATE, TAXENF, VARCOMP, EARNVOL). We control for various 
characteristics of the country’s tax system such as: 1) whether the country’s tax system follows a 
worldwide or territorial approach (WW); 2) required book-tax conformity (BTAXC); 3) statutory 
tax rate (TAXRATE);
11
 and 4) strength of tax enforcement (TAXENF), because Atwood et al. 
(2012) find that these tax system characteristics are associated with firms’ incentives to avoid 
taxes.
12
 We include the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of total 
compensation (VARCOMP) because prior literature suggests that managerial compensation 
incentives affect tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2012; Atwood et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 
2012). We also include earnings volatility (EARNVOL) as a control because Atwood et al. (2010) 
report that BTAXC is positively correlated with the cross-sectional variance in pre-tax income, 
and hence it is important to include this variable to ensure that the effect of BTAXC on tax 
avoidance is not overstated due to cross-country differences in earnings volatility. 
 The second set of controls includes firm-level variables that are documented to be 
associated with tax avoidance. We control for firm performance using pre-tax return on assets 
(PROA) because profitable firms have greater incentives to avoid taxes. We control for firm size 
(SIZE) because larger firms have more resources and ability to avoid taxes. On the other hand, 
profitable and larger firms may avoid paying lower taxes to mitigate additional political scrutiny 
on paying their fair share of taxes. We control for tax planning opportunities, such as research 
                                                 
11 We include the statutory tax rate as a control variable following Atwood et al. (2012), who highlight that because 
the measure of tax avoidance includes the statutory tax rate in its computation, it is important to control for the 
statutory tax rate to avoid the potential mechanical relation. 
12 We hand-collect each country’s annual statutory corporate tax rate and whether the tax system is worldwide or 
territorial from various sources such as Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, KPMG’s Corporate 
and Indirect Tax Rate Survey, PwC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries, PwC’s “Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in 
the OECD” report, etc. 
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and development tax credits and interest deductibility on debt, using research and development 
intensity (R&D) and leverage (LEV). We control for sales growth (GROWTH) because firms 
with higher sales growth enjoy greater marginal benefits from tax planning and hence have 
greater incentives to avoid tax (Goh et al. 2013). Lastly, we control for firms with multinational 
operations (MULTI) because operations in different countries may present opportunities to avoid 
taxes through income shifting. 
Empirical Models – Cross-sectional Analyses 
To test H2, we modify equation (2) to include the conditioning variable (Conditional_VAR) and 
its interaction with TRUST: 
TAXAVOIDit = α + βTRUSTit + + ηTRUSTit × Conditional_VARit + γConditional_VARit  
+ ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit                                 (3) 
In H2, we examine the moderating effect of legal and formal institutions on the relation 
between societal trust and corporate tax avoidance. In H2a, we focus on investor protection in 
the country, for which we use three measures. The first measure is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the country is a common law country, and zero otherwise (COMMON). Prior 
literature suggests that strict and well-enforced laws to protect minority investors are more 
prevalent in countries with common law traditions than in countries with civil law traditions 
(e.g., Haw et al. 2004), which implies that the strength of investor protection is stronger in 
common law countries. The second measure is the law enforcement index of the country 
(LAWE), which is the mean score of three legal enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. 
(1998).
13
 The strength of investor protection is stronger when the quality of legal enforcement is 
                                                 
13
 The three variables are (1) the mean for 1980–1983 of a variable provided by Business International Corp., 
capturing the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system; (2) the mean for 1982–1995 of a rule of law variable 
obtained from International Country Risk; and (3) the mean for 1982–1995 of a corruption variable that assesses the 
corruption in government, obtained from International Country Risk. 
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higher. The third measure is the anti-self-dealing index (ANTISELF), based on Djankov et al. 
(2008). This measure is designed to capture the strength of minority shareholder protection 
against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder, and focuses on private enforcement 
mechanisms such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing 
transaction. The strength of investor protection is stronger when anti-self-dealing mechanisms 
are in place. We expect that societal trust and legal institutions are substitutes in constraining tax 
avoidance and, therefore, the effect of trust on tax avoidance is less pronounced when investor 
protection is stronger. Hence, based on H2a, we expect η to be positive in equation (3). 
 In H2b, we focus on the disclosure requirement that affects the information environment 
in the country, for which we use three measures. The first measure is the CIFAR disclosure index 
of the country (DISC),
14
 which has been used in prior studies (e.g., Bushman et al. 2004) to 
capture financial disclosure intensity. The second measure is the annual frequency of financial 
reports issued by public companies in the country (AVFR). Choy and Zheng (2011) find that 
firms in countries with more frequent financial reports have lower earnings announcement 
premia, which suggests that disclosure risk is lower with higher frequency of financial reporting. 
In a similar vein, we expect the quality of the disclosure environment to be better for countries 
with higher frequency of financial reporting. The third measure is the proportion of firms that are 
audited by the Big N auditors in the country (PBIG). Although this measure does not speak to 
disclosure requirement directly, it captures the overall information quality of firms’ financial 
reporting. We therefore use this measure to supplement our two disclosure requirement proxies 
(DISC, and AFVR). It is well documented that audit quality is higher for firms audited by Big N 
                                                 
14 This measure is constructed based on the examination of annual reports from about 1,000 industrial companies 
across several countries collected in 1995, and the disclosure index is designed to capture the financial disclosure 
practices of each country based on the average number of 90 accounting and nonaccounting items disclosed by the 
sample companies in their annual reports. 
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auditors as compared to those audited by non-Big N auditors (e.g., Becker et al. 1998). 
Therefore, we expect the quality of the disclosure environment to be better in countries with a 
higher proportion of firms that are audited by the Big N auditors in the country. We expect that 
societal trust and general disclosure environment are substitutes in constraining tax avoidance, 
and therefore the effect of trust on tax avoidance is less pronounced when the disclosure 
environment is better. Hence, based on H2b, we expect η to be positive in equation (3). 
 In H2c, we focus on tax enforcement in the country. Following Atwood et al (2012), we 
measure the strength of tax enforcement using a measure of managers’ perception of the strength 
of tax enforcement in the country (TAXENF), which is derived from the 1996 World 
Competitiveness Report. We expect that societal trust and tax enforcement regulation are 
substitutes in constraining tax avoidance, and therefore the effect of trust on tax avoidance is less 
pronounced when tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. Hence, based on H2c, we expect η 
to be positive in equation (3). 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Sample 
We construct our measures of tax avoidance and other firm-level control variables with data 
obtained for the 1995–2007 period from the Compustat Global database. We identify 36 
countries with these firm-level variables available and which each have a minimum of 100 firm-
year observations. Our main variable of interest, TRUST, is constructed based on individual 
responses to the World Values Surveys (WVS). The surveys were conducted in five waves in 
1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008. Following prior literature (e.g., 
Ahern et al. 2013; Pevzner et al. 2013), we match the most recent TRUST measure to our firm-
level variables. We remove seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
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Ireland, and Portugal) that do not have the societal trust measure available. The country-level 
institutional variables are either hand-collected (e.g., statutory tax rates, classification of 
worldwide or territorial tax system, etc.) or based on the data published by other authors (e.g., 
law enforcement index from La Porta et al. 1998, anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. 
2008). We also remove four countries (China, India, Pakistan, and Russia) for which the tax 
enforcement variable is not available. Our final sample thus includes 25 countries.
15
 The number 
of countries represented in the sample is comparable to those of prior studies (e.g., 22 countries 
in Atwood et al. 2002, and 25 countries in Pevzner et al. 2013). We also trim each continuous 
firm-level variable at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effect of extreme values. Depending 
on the availability of data, the final sample size used in the regression analyses ranges from 
74,421 to 79,834 firm-year observations for the 13-year sample period. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the sample composition and the median characteristics for each of the 25 
countries. The sample size for each country ranges widely from 105 firm-year observations for 
Israel to 32,833 firm-year observations for Japan. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the 
sample comes from Japan and the U.S.
16
 Our main test variable is TRUST. As observed from 
Table 1, levels of societal trust vary widely across countries. People in the Nordic countries 
(Finland, Norway, Sweden) have the highest levels of trust in other people (about 60% or more 
of those interviewed answered that most of people can be trusted) while people in Brazil and the 
                                                 
15
 These countries include Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
16 In a robustness test, we exclude sample observations from Japan and the U.S. to mitigate concerns that our results 
are driven by the large number sample observations from these two countries. We also re-estimate our models by 
country-year, so that each country-year observation receives equal weight in the regression (see Section V). 
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Philippines exhibit the lowest levels of interpersonal trust (less than 10% think that most people 
can be trusted).  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of the regression variables for the 
full sample. As observed from Table 2 Panel A, the mean (median) percentage of taxes avoided 
from pre-tax income (TAXAVOID) is 13.2% (11.4%) which, based on the mean (median) 
statutory corporate tax rate (TAXRATE) of 39% (40%), implies that the mean (median) firm in 
our sample paid a tax rate of 25.8% (28.6%). The mean (median) value of societal trust (TRUST) 
in our sample is 0.390 (0.391), which is comparable to that reported in Pevzner et al. (2013).  
Table 2 Panel B reports Pearson correlations between the variables in our analyses. As 
predicted by H1, we observe a significant and negative correlation between societal trust 
(TRUST) and tax avoidance (TAXAVOID). The correlations between the proxies for investor 
protection (COMMON, LAWE and ANTISELF) and the proxies for disclosure requirement 
(DISC, AVFR and PBIG) are all positive, indicating that these proxies capture similar dimensions 
of the underlying construct of interest. Because these are pairwise univariate correlations, we 
defer the main analyses to multivariate tests, reported in the following section. 
Main Analyses – Test of H1 
In this section, we report our results for the test of H1, which examines the association between 
societal trust and tax avoidance. In Column 1, we regress tax avoidance on societal trust and 
country, year and industry fixed-effects, and exclude the firm-level control variables. In Column 
2, we report the results including firm-level control variables, and in Column 3, we report the 
results including additional controls for country-level tax system. In all three columns, we report 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient on TRUST, which is consistent with our 
prediction in H1. The effect of societal trust on tax avoidance is also economically significant. 
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Specifically, when we examine column 2 where we do not include controls for home country tax 
system characteristics, a one standard deviation increase in societal trust is associated with a 
28.2% decrease in tax avoidance.
17
 After controlling for home country tax system characteristics 
in Column 3, the incremental effect of trust on tax avoidance decreases to 3.3%. This suggests 
that societal trust has an effect on mitigating tax avoidance over and above legal institutions such 
as home country tax system characteristics, which are arguably more effective in constraining tax 
avoidance. 
 The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with expectations. Similar to 
Atwood et al. (2012), we find that tax system characteristics, such as having a worldwide tax 
system (WW), higher required book-tax conformity (BTAXC), and greater perceived tax 
enforcement (TAXENF), are associated with less tax avoidance. We also find that in countries 
with higher statutory tax rates (TAXRATE) and in countries where managers have higher variable 
compensation (VARCOMP), firms engage in more tax avoidance, possibly due to the additional 
incentives to avoid taxes when statutory tax rates are higher and when managers have high-
powered incentives. Turning to the other firm-level control variables, we find that profitable 
(PROA) and larger (SIZE) firms have lower tax avoidance, possibly due to additional political 
scrutiny of such firms. We also find that firms with higher leverage (LEV) and sales growth 
(GROWTH) exhibit higher tax avoidance, consistent with greater opportunities to avoid taxes for 
firms with more debt and greater marginal benefits of avoiding taxes for growth firms. Lastly, 
consistent with Rego (2003), we find that firms with multi-national operations have lower tax 
avoidance. 
                                                 
17 The impact of a one standard deviation increase in societal trust (TRUST) on tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) is 
computed as -0.409 (coefficient on TRUST) × 0.091 (the sample standard deviation of TRUST) ÷ 0.132 (the mean of 
TAXAVOID) = -28.2%. The other comparative statics are computed analogously. 
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 Overall, the results indicate that societal trust is significantly associated with lower tax 
avoidance, consistent with firms and managers responding to social norms and expectations 
when shaping their corporate tax planning activities. 
Cross-sectional Analyses – Test of H2 
In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the relation between societal trust and tax 
avoidance. In particular, we are interested in whether formal institutions such as legal and 
disclosure environments have a substitutive relationship with societal trust in constraining tax 
avoidance. In H2a, we examine the moderating role of investor protection; we expect societal 
trust to play a smaller role in countries where investor protection is high. The results of our tests 
are presented in Table 4. In Column 1, we use an indicator variable for common law countries 
(COMMON); in Column 2, we use the law enforcement index (LAWE); and in Column 3, we use 
the anti-self-dealing index (ANTISELF) based on Djankov et al. (2008), as proxies for investor 
protection. Consistent with our prediction in H2a, we find across all three columns that the 
negative association between societal trust and tax avoidance is attenuated in countries with 
stronger investor protection, which is consistent with investor protection and societal trust acting 
as substitute mechanisms in constraining tax avoidance. In addition, the coefficients of LEGAL 
are all negative and significant, indicating that tax avoidance is lower in countries with stronger 
legal institutions. 
 In H2b, we examine the moderating role of the disclosure and overall information 
environment; we expect societal trust to play a smaller role in countries where disclosure 
requirements and information quality are high. The results of our tests are presented in Table 5. 
In Column 1, we use the CIFAR disclosure index (DISC); in Column 2, we use the annual 
frequency of financial reporting (AVFR); and in Column 3, we use the proportion of firms 
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audited by the Big N auditors in the country (PBIG), as proxies for disclosure and information 
environment. Consistent with H2b, we find across all three columns that the negative association 
between societal trust and tax avoidance is attenuated in countries with higher disclosure 
requirements and better information environment. The finding is consistent with societal trust 
becoming less important in constraining tax avoidance when the general information 
environment is better, as it facilitates monitoring of tax avoidance by external monitors. Also, we 
find that AVFR and PBIG are both significant and negatively associated with tax avoidance, 
which suggests that better information environment curtails tax avoidance activities. 
 In H2c, we examine the moderating role of tax enforcement. We predict that societal trust 
plays a smaller role in constraining tax avoidance when tax enforcement in the country is high. 
The results are presented in Table 6. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the relation 
between societal trust and tax avoidance is attenuated in countries with stronger tax enforcement.  
Overall, the results presented in Tables 3 through 5 indicate a substitutive relation 
between formal institutions, such as investor protection, information environment and tax 
enforcement, and informal institutions proxied by societal trust, in constraining tax avoidance.  
 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY CHECKS 
Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Approach 
We recognize that, like most studies of this type, our study may suffer from omitted variable 
problems, because it is difficult to control for all possible variables that potentially affect the 
formulation and accumulation of trust.  These potentially omitted variables could also be related 
to firms’ incentives and inclination to avoid tax in a given country, and thus our findings may be 
spurious. Our cross-sectional analyses mitigate this concern because it is arguably harder for an 
omitted correlated variable to explain both our main and our cross-sectional findings. Also, in all 
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our cross-sectional analyses, we include additional controls for country-level legal and formal 
institutional variables such as investor protection and disclosure environment, and thus it is more 
difficult to find an omitted latent institutional variable that explains both country-level societal 
trust and tax avoidance in our analyses. Nonetheless, we attempt to address potential endogeneity 
concerns by employing an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach. 
 Following prior work, we use a country’s primary religious adherence as an instrument 
for the level of societal trust because prior studies suggest that religious beliefs are more 
primitive than culture and thus can be considered exogenous (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997; Stulz and 
Williamson 2003; Guiso et al. 2006, 2008; Pevzner et al. 2013). Guiso et al. (2003) also 
highlight that religion has an influence on an individual’s trust of others, and hence religious 
belief can be used as a relevant instrument for societal trust.  We obtain information on each 
country’s primary religion from Stulz and Williamson (2003). Based on the countries included in 
our sample, we identify six main religions: Protestant, Catholic, Buddhism, Islam and Judaism, 
and an unidentified local indigenous belief for Hong Kong. We create five indicator variables 
representing these six religions (with Judaism representing the excluded indicator variable) and 
use them as our instruments in the first-stage regression explaining societal trust.  
 We report the results of the first-stage regression in Table 7 Column 1. As indicated in 
the table, the five instruments are all significantly associated with TRUST, and the absolute 
magnitude of the t-statistics range from 3.75 to 26.00, which suggests that these instruments are 
relevant. Comparing the level of trust across various religions, we find that Protestants, Muslims 
and Hong Kong’s local belief are more trusting relative to Judaism, and that Catholic and 
Buddhist are less trusting relative to Judaism. 
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We then use the predicted value of TRUST from the first-stage regression as our variable 
of interest in the second-stage, and report the results in Table 7, Column 2. The results show that 
the predicted value of TRUST is significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance, which is 
consistent with the results reported in the main analyses. Overall, the results from the 
instrumental variable approach indicate that our main results still hold after controlling for 
potential endogeneity. 
Controlling for Accrual Components 
Next, we investigate the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance after controlling for 
accruals. Nanda and Wysocki (2013) find that societal trust is associated with less earnings 
management, and therefore the negative association between societal trust and tax avoidance that 
we document could be due to the mechanical effect of accruals on tax avoidance (that is, societal 
trust affects tax avoidance through accruals). Hence, the purpose of this analysis is to determine 
whether societal trust affects tax avoidance solely through accruals or through other non-accrual-
related tax-planning strategies, such as the use of tax havens, tax shelters, income shifting, cost 
sharing arrangements, etc. To do so, we decompose total accruals into three components (WC, 
NCO and FIN) based on the reliability classification developed by Richardson et al. (2005) 
and used in Atwood et al. (2012). We include these three components in our main analyses in 
order to allow different types of accruals to differentially affect tax avoidance. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 8. 
 As reported in this table, all three components of accruals are positively associated with 
tax avoidance, which is consistent with prior literature that documents a positive relation 
between accruals and tax avoidance/sheltering (e.g., Frank et al. 2009; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 
2010; Atwood et al. 2012). We also find that societal trust continues to be significantly 
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negatively associated with tax avoidance. This result suggests that the relation between societal 
trust and tax avoidance that we document is not solely driven by accruals management, but also 
results from other tax planning strategies. 
Alternative Measures of Trust 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by considering three alternative measures of 
trust. The first measure is an alternative trust index used in Pevzner et al. (2013) and Nanda and 
Wysocki (2013), and is calculated for each country based on the following formula: 
TRUST_INDEX = 100 + (% most people can be trusted) – (% can’t be too careful) 
 The second and third measures are based on individuals’ trust in the government 
(TRUST_GOVT) and parliament (TRUST_PARLIAMENT). The reason for this analysis is that 
firms’ decisions to respond to social norms and to reciprocate society’s trust in them by paying 
their fair share of taxes also depends on the extent to which they trust the government and 
parliamentary system to redistribute the tax revenue equitably to ensure social fairness. We 
construct these two measures of trust based on the following question from the WVS: Do you 
have a lot of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, no confidence at 
all in the following: Government and Parliament, respectively. We recode the response to these 
questions to one if a survey participant reports that he/she has a lot of confidence or quite a lot of 
confidence in government or parliament, and zero otherwise. We then calculate the mean 
responses for each country-year as alternative measures of societal trust. The estimation results 
using these three alternative measures of trust are reported in Table 9, Columns 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
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 As indicated in this table, all three alternative measures of trust are significantly 
negatively associated with tax avoidance, indicating that our inferences are robust to the measure 
of trust used. 
Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance 
We also test the robustness of our results using two alternative measures of corporate tax 
avoidance. For the first alternative measure, we compute tax avoidance based on the difference 
between the taxes on pre-tax income computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax rate 
and the tax expense recognized instead of the taxes actually paid. This measure is more closely 
related to the concept of GAAP effective tax rate because it measures tax avoidance based on tax 
expense recognized rather than cash tax actually paid. Armstrong et al. (2012) find that U.S. tax 
managers are more focused on reducing the effective tax rate reported in the financial statements 
but not the actual cash tax savings, so we examine whether societal trust differentially affects the 
incentives to reduce effective tax rate and cash tax paid.  For the second alternative measure, we 
use a longer time window of 5 years, instead of 3 years in our original measure of tax avoidance, 
to assess how societal trust affects long-run tax avoidance. The disadvantage of using this long-
run measure of tax avoidance is that it reduces our sample size substantially as it requires five 
years of data for each firm. The results of the analyses using these two alternative measures of 
tax avoidance (TAXAVOID_ALT1 and TAXAVOID_ALT2) are reported in Table 10, Columns 1 
and 2 respectively. 
 As shown in Table 10 Column 1, we continue to find that societal trust is negatively 
associated with tax avoidance, which suggests that societal trust also reduces firms’ incentives to 
report a lower effective tax rate in the financial statements. In Column 2, we also find that 
societal trust is associated with lower long-run tax avoidance. Overall, the results suggest that the 
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negative relation between societal trust and tax avoidance holds for these two alternative 
measures. 
Additional Robustness Checks 
We discuss a few additional robustness checks in this sub-section. As highlighted earlier, a 
significant portion of our firm-year observations consists of firms from the U.S. and Japan. To 
mitigate the concern that our results are driven by observations from these two countries, we re-
estimate our models using three different samples. First, we exclude observations of firms from 
the U.S. Second, we exclude observations from both the U.S. and Japan. Third, in a much more 
restrictive test, we re-run our analyses based on country-year observations so that each country-
year receives equal weight in the regression. The downside of this approach is that it reduces the 
variation in our sample substantially. The results are presented in Table 11, Columns 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. As observed from this table, we still find a significant negative relation between 
societal trust and tax avoidance for all three samples. These analyses provide additional evidence 
that our results are not driven by over-representation from certain countries. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Societal trust is an important element of a country’s culture and extant literature finds that trust 
affects a broad set of social and economic outcomes such as facilitating economic growth and 
social efficiency (La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack and Zak 2001), 
international trade and investment (Guiso et al. 2009), financial development (Guiso et al. 2004, 
2008), corporate financing and merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions (Bottazi et al. 2011; 
Ahern et al. 2013; Duarte et al. 2012). We extend this important line of research by examining 
whether societal trust affects corporate tax avoidance. We predict that in societies with higher 
levels of trust, managers will refrain from actions that may betray the trust that society has 
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placed in them with an expectation that they pay a fair share of corporate taxes. Therefore, we 
expect societal trust to be negatively associated with tax avoidance. 
Using a large sample of firm-year observations across 25 countries, we find robust 
evidence of a negative relation between societal trust and tax avoidance, even after controlling 
for the effects of legal institutions such as tax system characteristics that have been documented 
to be effective in constraining tax avoidance (Atwood et al. 2012). The results are also 
economically significant. When we exclude (include) home country’s tax system characteristics, 
a one standard deviation increase in societal trust is associated with a 28.2% (3.3%) decrease in 
tax avoidance. These results indicate that societal trust has an important effect in mitigating tax 
avoidance, over and above the effects of legal institutions such as home country tax system 
characteristics. 
In additional analyses, we find that societal trust and legal institutions such as investor 
protection, disclosure environment and tax enforcement have a substitutive effect in constraining 
tax avoidance. That is, the effect of societal trust in constraining tax avoidance is less salient 
when formal institutions in the country are already strong. Our inferences are robust to a number 
of sensitivity tests, including using an instrumental variable approach to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns, controlling for accrual components to ensure that our results are not driven by the 
mechanical relation between accruals and tax avoidance, using three alternative measures of 
trust, using two alternative measures of tax avoidance, and accounting for sample over-
representation from the U.S. and Japan. 
We make several important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature that investigates cross-country determinants of corporate tax avoidance by showing that 
informal institutions such as societal trust also affect tax avoidance, even after explicitly 
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controlling for the tax systems in a country. Second, we extend the growing literature on the 
accounting implications of societal trust. Except for Nanda and Wysocki (2013) and Pevzner et 
al. (2013), very few studies examine the relation between trust and financial and tax reporting. 
We contribute to this line of research by showing that societal trust affects firms’ tax reporting 
decisions. Third, our study is relevant to tax policymakers concerned about declining corporate 
tax revenues and the increasing gap between reported earnings and taxable income. Our findings 
suggest that societal trust acts as a substitute for these formal institutions in mitigating corporate 
tax avoidance. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
 
TAXAVOID = Measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
 ∑             ∑       
 
   
 
   
∑        
 
   
 
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is 
home-country statutory corporate tax rate and CTP is current taxes 
paid. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. 
TRUST = Societal trust index, based on responses to the WVS question: 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? The two 
possible answers were “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be 
too careful”. We recode the response to this question to one if a 
survey participant reports that most people can be trusted, and zero 
otherwise. We then calculate the mean of the response for each 
country year. Higher values correspond to higher societal trust. 
WW = An indicator that equals one if the home-country adopts a 
worldwide tax system, and zero if the home-country adopts a 
territorial tax system. 
BTAXC = Proxy for the level of required book-tax conformity, following 
Atwood et al. (2010). BTAXC is computed based on the conditional 
variance of current tax expense from the following model, 
estimated by country-year: 
                                      
where CTE is current tax expense, PTBI is pre-tax book income, 
ForPTBI is the estimated foreign pre-tax book income, DIV is total 
dividends, and all variables are scaled by average total assets. 
BTAXC is then computed as the scaled ranking of the root mean 
squared errors (RMSE) from these country-year regressions, and 
RMSEs are ranked in descending order so that higher values of 
BTAXC indicate higher required book-tax conformity. 
TAXRATE = Country statutory tax rate. 
TAXENF = Proxy for the level of tax enforcement in the country, based on the 
1996 World Competitiveness Report. 
VARCOMP = The sum of the value of option compensation and restricted stock 
compensation divided by total compensation at the country level, to 
proxy for CEO incentives. Data is from Bryan et al. (2010). 
EARNVOL = Country-level control variable for earnings volatility. 
PROA = Pre-tax return on assets. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
R&D = Research and development expenditures scaled by total assets. 
LEV = Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
GROWTH = Percentage change in sales. 
MULTI = An indicator variable that equals zero if foreign income taxes is 
missing or zero, and equals one otherwise. 
COMMON = An indicator variable that equals one if the country is a common 
law country, and zero otherwise. 
LAWE = Law enforcement index, which is the mean score of the three legal 
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enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998).  
ANTISELF = Anti-self-dealing index of the country, based on Djankov et al. 
(2008). 
DISC = CIFAR disclosure index of the country, which is based on firms’ 
annual reports in 1995. 
AVFR = Annual frequency of financial reports issued by public companies 
in the country, as reported in Choy and Zheng (2011). 
PBIG = The proportion of firms that are audited by the Big N auditors in the 
country. 
TRUST_INDEX = Societal trust index, based on responses to the WVS question: 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? The two 
possible answers were “Most people can be trusted” and “Can’t be 
too careful”. Based on the responses, the trust index is computed 
for each country as: 100 + (% most people can be trusted) – (% 
can’t be too careful). Higher values correspond to higher societal 
trust. 
TRUST_GOVT = Country-year average of rescaled response to the following WVS 
question: Do you have a lot of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence, no confidence at all in the following: 
Government. We recode the response to these questions to one if a 
survey participant reports that he/she has a lot of confidence or 
quite a lot of confidence in government, and zero otherwise. We 
then calculate the mean of the response of each country-year as an  
alternative measure of societal trust. Higher values correspond to 
higher societal trust. 
TRUST_PARLIAMENT = Country-year average of rescaled response to the following WVS 
question: Do you have a lot of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence, no confidence at all in the following: 
Parliament. We recode the response to these questions to one if a 
survey participant reports that he/she has a lot of confidence or 
quite a lot of confidence in parliament, and zero otherwise. We then 
calculate the mean of the response of each country-year as an 
alternative measure of societal trust. Higher values correspond to 
higher societal trust. 
WC = Change in current operating assets minus current operating 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
NCO = Change in noncurrent operating assets minus noncurrent operating 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
FIN = Change in financial assets minus financial liabilities, scaled by total 
assets. 
PROTEST, CATHOLIC, 
BUDDHIST, MUSLIM 
and INDIG 
= An indicator that equals one if a country’s primary religious belief 
is one of these four religions, and zero otherwise. INDIG is an 
indicator variable capturing Hong Kong’s local religious belief. The 
data is obtained from Stulz and Williamson (2003).  
TAXAVOID_ALT1 = Alternative measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
 ∑             ∑       
 
   
 
   
∑        
 
   
 
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is 
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home-country statutory corporate tax rate and CTE is current tax 
expense. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. 
TAXAVOID_ALT2 = Alternative measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
 ∑             ∑       
 
   
 
   
∑        
 
   
 
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is 
home-country statutory corporate tax rate and CTP is current taxes 
paid. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Composition and Median Characteristics by Country 
Country N TAXAVOID TRUST COMMON LAWE ANTISELF DISC AVFR PBIG TAXENF WW 
Australia 2,894 0.30 0.48 1.00 9.51 0.79 80.00 1.95 0.22 4.58 0.00 
Brazil 300 0.11 0.09 0.00 6.13 0.29 56.00 - 0.78 2.14 1.00 
Chile 373 0.05 0.23 0.00 6.52 0.63 78.00 2.05 0.77 4.20 1.00 
Finland 305 0.10 0.59 0.00 10.00 0.46 83.00 3.62 0.62 5.53 0.00 
France 1,101 0.22 0.19 0.00 8.68 0.38 78.00 1.98 0.37 3.86 0.00 
Germany 1,334 0.26 0.34 0.00 9.05 0.28 67.00 2.44 0.38 3.41 0.00 
Hong Kong  358 0.12 0.41 1.00 8.91 0.96 73.00 2.20 0.66 4.56 0.00 
Indonesia 1,249 0.24 0.52 0.00 2.90 0.68 - - 0.39 2.53 1.00 
Israel 105 0.17 0.23 1.00 7.72 0.71 74.00 - 0.52 3.69 1.00 
Italy 539 0.20 0.29 0.00 7.07 0.39 66.00 3.25 0.72 1.77 0.00 
Japan 32,833 0.02 0.43 0.00 9.17 0.48 71.00 2.49 0.00 4.41 1.00 
Korea, Rep. 1,739 0.26 0.27 0.00 5.55 0.46 68.00 2.08 0.02 3.29 1.00 
Mexico 329 0.14 0.22 0.00 5.37 0.18 71.00 - 0.69 2.46 1.00 
Netherlands 315 0.20 0.44 0.00 10.00 0.21 74.00 - 0.79 3.40 0.00 
New Zealand 189 0.19 0.51 1.00 100.00 0.95 80.00 2.41 0.51 5.00 0.00 
Norway 277 0.22 0.74 0.00 10.00 0.44 75.00 3.76 0.78 3.96 0.00 
Peru 109 0.17 0.11 0.00 - 0.41 - - 0.61 2.66 1.00 
Philippines 597 0.32 0.09 0.00 3.47 0.24 64.00 3.68 0.21 1.83 1.00 
Singapore 1,421 0.09 0.15 1.00 8.93 1.00 79.00 2.60 0.70 5.05 0.00 
Spain 1,110 0.17 0.34 0.00 7.14 0.37 72.00 3.74 0.70 1.91 0.00 
Sweden 2,251 0.14 0.66 0.00 10.00 0.34 83.00 - 0.71 3.39 1.00 
Switzerland 467 0.11 0.51 0.00 10.00 0.27 80.00 - 0.62 4.49 0.00 
Turkey 288 0.23 0.19 0.00 4.79 0.43 58.00 - 0.53 2.07 1.00 
UK 2,783 0.22 0.30 1.00 9.22 0.93 85.00 2.01 0.51 4.67 1.00 
USA 26,568 0.15 0.36 1.00 9.50 0.65 76.00 3.98 0.91 4.47 1.00 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Country BTAXC TAXRATE VARCOMP EARNVOL PROA SIZE R&D LEV GROWTH MULTI 
Australia 0.17 0.30 0.31 0.15 -0.05 3.26 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.00 
Brazil 0.48 0.34 0.02 0.64 0.09 7.99 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.00 
Chile 0.88 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.07 8.41 0.00 0.24 0.05 0.00 
Finland 0.69 0.26 0.03 0.56 0.09 5.45 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.00 
France 0.74 0.33 0.14 0.55 0.07 5.44 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.00 
Germany 0.52 0.38 0.05 0.47 0.06 4.95 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.00 
Hong Kong 0.62 0.18 0.01 0.44 0.07 7.61 0.00 0.18 0.11 1.00 
Indonesia 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.04 7.42 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.00 
Israel 0.71 0.36 0.16 0.69 0.03 6.97 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.00 
Italy 0.57 0.37 0.05 0.95 0.05 6.12 0.00 0.26 0.06 0.00 
Japan 0.62 0.42 0.02 0.15 0.04 10.08 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.00 
Korea, Rep. 0.43 0.30 0.00 0.07 0.06 8.03 0.00 0.26 0.06 0.00 
Mexico 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.08 9.10 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.00 
Netherlands 0.55 0.30 0.25 0.58 0.08 6.39 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.00 
New Zealand 0.79 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.08 5.08 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.00 
Norway 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.58 0.09 6.98 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.00 
Peru 0.88 0.30 0.00 0.62 0.13 6.99 0.00 0.23 0.06 0.00 
Philippines 0.69 0.32 0.00 0.44 0.01 8.14 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.00 
Singapore 0.55 0.25 0.13 0.47 0.04 4.92 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.00 
Spain 0.71 0.35 0.02 0.20 0.06 7.58 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.00 
Sweden 0.36 0.28 0.09 0.45 0.06 7.42 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.00 
Switzerland 0.86 0.21 0.04 0.76 0.08 6.38 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.00 
Turkey 0.45 0.33 0.00 0.36 0.11 8.06 0.00 0.16 0.24 0.00 
UK 0.45 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.07 4.17 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.00 
USA 0.02 0.40 0.40 0.22 0.07 6.18 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00 
This table provides the sample composition and selected median characteristics by country. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided 
in the Appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics      
 
Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
TAXAVOID 0.132 0.114 -0.013 0.301 0.271 
TRUST 0.390 0.391 0.363 0.431 0.091 
COMMON 0.430 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 
LAWE 9.213 9.170 9.170 9.500 4.610 
ANTISELF 0.562 0.480 0.480 0.650 0.154 
DISC 73.988 73.000 71.000 76.000 4.429 
AVFR 3.006 2.490 2.490 3.980 0.778 
PBIG 0.425 0.377 0.000 0.914 0.409 
TAXENF 4.249 4.410 4.410 4.470 0.612 
WW 0.861 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.346 
BTAXC 0.361 0.357 0.048 0.619 0.270 
TAXRATE 0.390 0.400 0.340 0.420 0.070 
VARCOMP 0.170 0.040 0.024 0.395 0.172 
EARNVOL 0.231 0.182 0.127 0.273 0.157 
PROA 0.118 0.048 0.008 0.105 2.598 
SIZE 7.761 7.924 5.725 10.021 2.787 
R&D 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.143 
LEV 0.246 0.202 0.048 0.359 0.517 
GROWTH 0.373 0.040 -0.033 0.148 3.494 
MULTI 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.386 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) TAXAVOID 1.00 
                   (2) TRUST_INDEX -0.06 1.00 
                  (3) COMMON 0.15 -0.24 1.00 
                 (4) LAWE 0.00 0.16 0.14 1.00 
                (5) ANTISELF 0.09 -0.22 0.80 0.16 1.00 
               (6) DISC 0.10 0.18 0.63 0.17 0.64 1.00 
              (7) AVFR 0.09 -0.13 0.66 0.00 0.21 0.24 1.00 
             (8) PBIG 0.15 -0.21 0.81 0.05 0.44 0.54 0.86 1.00 
            (9) TAXENF -0.06 0.16 0.39 0.25 0.51 0.39 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
           (10) WW -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.24 0.25 -0.07 0.19 1.00 
          (11) BTAXC -0.14 0.05 -0.78 0.00 -0.45 -0.39 -0.75 -0.74 -0.18 -0.13 1.00 
         (12) TAXRATE -0.12 0.18 -0.29 0.03 -0.32 -0.50 -0.01 -0.40 0.24 0.51 0.19 1.00 
        (13) VARCOMP 0.15 -0.14 0.94 0.17 0.59 0.56 0.79 0.86 0.32 0.05 -0.85 -0.17 1.00 
       (14) EARNVOL 0.06 -0.20 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.17 0.04 0.25 -0.27 -0.50 0.15 -0.38 0.00 1.00 
      (15) PROA -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
     (16) SIZE -0.22 0.19 -0.61 -0.07 -0.47 -0.53 -0.32 -0.57 -0.05 0.33 0.46 0.45 -0.57 -0.23 0.09 1.00 
    (17) R&D 0.09 -0.01 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 1.00 
   (18) LEV 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.13 1.00 
  (19) GROWTH 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.50 0.08 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
 (20) MULTI 0.03 -0.12 0.49 0.03 0.31 0.27 0.47 0.50 0.15 0.08 -0.43 -0.11 0.50 0.05 0.00 -0.16 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 1.00 
This table provides the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) of the main variables used in this study. The detailed 
definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles. All correlations that are 
bold are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.193 8.01*** 0.132 4.90*** 0.387 24.12*** 
TRUST -0.185 -2.97*** -0.409 -5.82*** -0.048 -3.21*** 
WW     -0.022 -5.21*** 
BTAXC     -0.016 -1.94** 
TAXRATE   0.653 10.01*** 0.073 2.70*** 
TAXENF     -0.040 -15.89*** 
VARCOMP     0.156 9.05*** 
EARNVOL   -0.011 -1.22 -0.038 -4.65*** 
PROA   -0.002 -4.78*** -0.002 -5.10*** 
SIZE   -0.013 -13.95*** -0.015 -18.14*** 
R&D   0.050 1.63 0.045 1.53 
LEV   0.037 2.91*** 0.036 2.87*** 
GROWTH   0.003 8.45*** 0.003 9.13*** 
MULTI   -0.034 -8.07*** -0.032 -7.99*** 
      
Country- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes No 
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 6.44 8.46 7.81 
n 79,834 79,834 79,834 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. The 
dependent variable is tax avoidance (TAXAVOID), which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. 
Column 1 shows the results excluding control variables; Column 2 shows the results including control 
variables, but without country-level tax system controls; and Column 3 shows the results including 
additional controls for country-level tax system. The regressions in Column 1 and 2 include year, 
industry, and country fixed effects, while the regression in Column 3 includes year and industry fixed 
effects. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year, 
industry and year indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance – The Role of Legal Institutions 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 LEGAL = COMMON LEGAL = LAWE LEGAL = ANTISELF 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.383 23.87*** 0.486 19.21*** 0.427 21.80*** 
TRUST -0.075 -4.48*** -0.342 -5.73*** -0.231 -6.23*** 
LEGAL*TRUST 0.256 6.45*** 0.037 5.25*** 0.397 5.80*** 
LEGAL -0.053 -3.26*** -0.020 -5.31*** -0.108 -3.81*** 
WW -0.018 -4.04*** -0.028 -6.55*** -0.021 -4.83*** 
BTAXC -0.028 -3.41*** -0.017 -1.95** -0.023 -2.85*** 
TAXRATE 0.071 2.45** 0.125 4.36*** 0.038 1.24 
TAXENF -0.039 -12.98*** -0.030 -9.60*** -0.037 -11.29*** 
VARCOMP 0.016 0.65 0.169 9.29**** 0.117 6.60*** 
EARNVOL -0.012 -1.39 -0.036 -4.41*** -0.014 -1.66* 
PROA -0.002 -4.94*** -0.002 -4.98*** -0.002 -5.00*** 
SIZE -0.015 -17.33*** -0.015 -18.25*** -0.015 -17.36*** 
R&D 0.046 1.54 0.044 1.51 0.046 1.55 
LEV 0.037 2.88*** 0.037 2.86*** 0.036 2.88*** 
GROWTH 0.003 8.97*** 0.003 9.18*** 0.003 8.94*** 
MULTI -0.032 -7.67*** -0.031 -7.67*** -0.031 -7.64*** 
      
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 7.89 7.86 7.88 
n 79,834 79,725 79,834 
This table reports the regression results of the role of legal institutions (LEGAL) on the relation between 
tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal trust (TRUST). The dependent variable is tax TAXAVOID, 
which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. LEGAL is proxied by an indicator variable for 
common law jurisdiction in Column 1, by the law enforcement index of the country in Column 2, and by 
the anti-self-dealing index of the country in Column 3. The detailed definitions of all variables are 
provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for 
brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance– The Role of Information Environment 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 InfoEnv = DISC InfoEnv = AVFR InfoEnv = PBIG 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.383 6.11*** 0.637 17.22*** 0.530 26.39*** 
TRUST -0.441 -2.15** -0.337 -4.53*** -0.388 -9.70*** 
InfoEnv*TRUST 0.005 1.81* 0.115 4.35*** 0.594 9.16*** 
InfoEnv 0.000 -0.04 -0.080 -7.03*** -0.288 -10.94*** 
WW -0.025 -5.55*** -0.007 -1.36 -0.024 -5.66*** 
BTAXC -0.011 -1.24 -0.041 -4.23*** -0.011 -1.28 
TAXRATE 0.160 4.78*** 0.103 3.21*** 0.049 1.67* 
TAXENF -0.042 -11.89*** -0.063 -16.81*** -0.041 -14.72*** 
VARCOMP 0.149 7.77*** 0.280 12.58*** 0.272 12.79*** 
EARNVOL -0.051 -6.06*** -0.005 -0.49 -0.016 -1.88* 
PROA -0.002 -4.93*** -0.003 -5.77*** -0.002 -4.87*** 
SIZE -0.015 -16.96*** -0.014 -14.91*** -0.015 -17.94*** 
R&D 0.045 1.55 0.043 1.38 0.045 1.54 
LEV 0.036 2.85*** 0.042 2.68*** 0.037 2.87*** 
GROWTH 0.004 8.78*** 0.004 8.52*** 0.003 9.00*** 
MULTI -0.032 -7.87*** -0.031 -7.31*** -0.030 -7.15*** 
      
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 7.86 8.20 8.05 
n 78,476 74,421 79,834 
This table reports the regression results of the role of information environment (InfoEnv) on the relation 
between tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal trust (TRUST). The dependent variable is TAXAVOID, 
which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. InfoEnv is proxied by the CIFAR disclosure index of 
the country in Column 1, by the annual frequency of financial reports issued by public companies in the 
country in Column 2, and by the proportion of firms that are audited by the Big N in the country in 
Column 3. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year 
and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance– The Role of Tax Enforcement 
  
 Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.472 20.39*** 
TRUST -0.211 -3.65*** 
TAXENF*TRUST 0.048 3.20*** 
TAXENF -0.056 -10.40*** 
WW -0.025 -6.08*** 
BTAXC -0.021 -2.59*** 
TAXRATE 0.073 2.73*** 
VARCOMP 0.140 8.18*** 
EARNVOL -0.037 -4.62*** 
PROA -0.002 -5.47*** 
SIZE -0.016 -19.49*** 
R&D 0.068 2.04** 
LEV 0.034 2.86*** 
GROWTH 0.004 10.02*** 
MULTI -0.024 -5.99*** 
   
Year- fixed effects Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes 
Adj Rsq 6.94 
n 79,834 
This table reports the regression results of the role of tax enforcement (TAXENF) on the relation between 
tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal trust (TRUST). The dependent variable is tax TAXAVOID, 
which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in 
the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The 
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the 
data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
50 
 
TABLE 7 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance– Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Approach 
    
 Column (1) Column (2) 
 
First-stage 
Dependent variable: 
TRUST 
Second-stage 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.116 10.25*** 0.335 19.80*** 
TRUST   -0.125 -5.10*** 
PROTEST 0.188 26.00***   
CATHOLIC -0.049 -7.41***   
BUDDHIST -0.027 -3.75***   
MUSLIM 0.098 8.66***   
INDIG 0.058 8.50***   
WW -0.080 -27.73*** -0.007 -1.70* 
BTAXC -0.040 -7.83*** 0.008 0.88 
TAXRATE 0.424 17.12*** 0.040 1.40 
TAXENF 0.033 12.45*** -0.046 -17.30*** 
VARCOMP -0.553 -27.98*** 0.191 10.49*** 
EARNVOL -0.002 -13.91*** 0.000 -2.87*** 
PROA 0.000 -2.17** -0.002 -5.01*** 
SIZE 0.009 22.91*** -0.016 -19.58*** 
R&D 0.018 3.73*** 0.042 1.44 
LEV 0.001 0.95 0.037 2.87*** 
GROWTH 0.000 -2.90*** 0.003 9.18*** 
MULTI -0.025 -14.88*** -0.030 -7.38*** 
     
Year- fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 44.21 7.84 
n 79,834 79,834 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal 
trust (TRUST), based on an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach. The dependent variable is 
TAXAVOID, which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. In Column 1, we report the results of the 
first-stage regression, where we regress TRUST on various instruments based on the religious adherence 
in the country and other control variables in the main regression. In Column 2, we report the second-stage 
results using the predicted value of TRUST from the first-stage. The detailed definitions of all variables 
are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated 
for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance – Controlling for accrual components 
  
 Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.386 24.06*** 
TRUST -0.047 -3.16*** 
WW -0.023 -5.49*** 
BTAXC -0.015 -1.87* 
TAXRATE 0.060 2.22** 
TAXENF -0.040 -15.79*** 
VARCOMP 0.167 9.65*** 
EARNVOL -0.001 -4.57*** 
PROA -0.002 -5.23*** 
SIZE -0.014 -17.17*** 
R&D 0.039 1.31 
LEV 0.036 2.77*** 
GROWTH 0.005 11.21*** 
MULTI -0.033 -8.06*** 
∆WC 0.114 11.66*** 
∆NCO 0.033 4.71*** 
∆FIN 0.019 2.40** 
   
Year- fixed effects Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes 
Adj Rsq 8.09 
n 79,803 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal 
trust (TRUST), including additional controls for accrual components. The dependent variable is tax 
avoidance TAXAVOID, which is increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. The detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not 
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance - Alternative Measures for Trust 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.386 24.07*** 0.440 19.45*** 0.432 20.33*** 
TRUST_INDEX 0.000 -3.17***     
TRUST_GOVT   -0.079 -3.33***   
TRUST_PARLIAMENT     -0.084 -4.12*** 
WW -0.021 -5.17*** -0.023 -5.74*** -0.027 -6.54*** 
BTAXC -0.016 -1.92* -0.022 -2.75*** -0.022 -2.68*** 
TAXRATE 0.072 2.67*** -0.073 -2.02** -0.055 -1.59 
TAXENF -0.040 -15.85*** -0.039 -15.26*** -0.039 -14.97*** 
VARCOMP 0.156 9.04*** 0.151 8.66*** 0.153 8.69*** 
EARNVOL -0.038 -4.62*** -0.023 -2.77*** -0.016 -1.83* 
PROA -0.002 -5.10*** -0.002 -4.97*** -0.002 -5.03*** 
SIZE -0.015 -18.12*** -0.015 -17.13*** -0.015 -18.24*** 
R&D 0.045 1.53 0.045 1.53 0.045 1.54 
LEV 0.036 2.87*** 0.036 2.85*** 0.036 2.84*** 
GROWTH 0.003 9.14*** 0.003 8.95*** 0.003 9.08*** 
MULTI -0.032 -7.99*** -0.031 -7.49*** -0.031 -7.55*** 
      
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 7.81 7.89 7.87 
n 79,834 76,683 78,308 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal 
trust (TRUST), using alternative measures of trust. The dependent variable is TAXAVOID, which is 
increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. TRUST is proxied using an alternative trust index in Column 1, 
by an alternative trust measure based on societal trust in the government in Column 2, and by an 
alternative trust measure based on societal trust in the parliament in Column 3. The detailed definitions of 
all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are 
not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for 
cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance - Alternative Measures for Tax Avoidance  
    
 Column (1) Column (2) 
 Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID_ALT1 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID_ALT2 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.391 23.70*** 0.460 26.10 
TRUST -0.051 -3.33*** -0.031 -1.95** 
WW -0.027 -5.97*** -0.017 -3.92** 
BTAXC 0.000 0.01 -0.007 -0.85 
TAXRATE 0.103 3.74*** -0.087 -3.03*** 
TAXENF -0.045 -17.71*** -0.046 -16.11*** 
VARCOMP 0.181 10.36*** 0.218 12.24*** 
EARNVOL -0.025 -3.09*** -0.064 -7.11*** 
PROA -0.003 -6.12*** -0.002 -3.71*** 
SIZE -0.016 -18.32*** -0.016 -19.02*** 
R&D 0.045 1.53 0.030 1.21 
LEV 0.036 2.85*** 0.030 2.41** 
GROWTH 0.003 6.23*** 0.003 6.83*** 
MULTI -0.032 -7.05*** -0.035 -8.18*** 
     
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes 
Adj Rsq 7.53 13.02 
n 79,780 56,605 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal 
trust (TRUST), using alternative measures of tax avoidance. The dependent variable is TAXAVOID, which 
is measured as the difference between the taxes on pre-tax income computed at the home-country 
statutory corporate tax rate and the tax expense recognized instead of the taxes actually paid 
(TAXAVOID_ALT1) in Column 1, and as our original measure of tax avoidance but using a longer time 
window of 5 years instead of 3 years (TAXAVOID_ALT2) in Column 2. The detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not 
tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Societal Trust and Tax Avoidance –  
Removing US and Japanese firms and country-year regressions 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) 
 Removing  
US firms 
Removing US and  
Japanese firms Country-year regressions 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.395 16.59*** 0.188 8.03*** 0.236 3.09*** 
TRUST -0.080 -4.91*** -0.025 -2.38** -0.105 -2.20** 
WW -0.014 -3.12*** 0.002 0.68 -0.027 -1.32 
BTAXC -0.050 -5.27*** -0.041 -5.01*** -0.038 -1.23 
TAXRATE -0.012 -0.37 0.563 13.42*** 0.133 1.19 
TAXENF -0.042 -15.65*** -0.011 -4.16*** -0.027 -3.55*** 
VARCOMP 0.259 9.90*** 0.019 0.92 0.157 1.91* 
EARNVOL -0.046 -4.75*** -0.071 -9.18*** 0.027 0.90 
PROA -0.001 -2.37** -0.001 -1.84* -0.046 -2.18** 
SIZE -0.014 -14.13*** -0.014 -23.03*** -0.005 -0.53 
R&D 0.055 2.44** 0.042 3.24*** 0.229 2.45*** 
LEV 0.087 2.36** 0.013 1.61 0.098 1.30 
GROWTH 0.003 7.30*** 0.002 4.82*** 0.044 2.60*** 
MULTI -0.025 -3.71*** -0.036 -7.31*** -0.031 -0.82 
      
Year- 
 fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry- 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes No 
Adj Rsq 7.43 9.49 19.66 
n 53,266 20,433 191 
This table reports the regression results of additional robustness checks of the relation between tax 
avoidance (TAXAVOID) and societal trust (TRUST). The dependent variable is TAXAVOID, which is 
increasing in the extent of tax avoidance. Column 1 shows the results excluding U.S. firms, Column 2 
shows the results excluding both U.S. and Japanese firms, and Column 3 shows the results for country-
year regressions. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on 
the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
